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Apart from its intrinsic value, this article has the added 
merit of providing a straightforward presentation of a 
prominent German scholar's views on Latin American 
industrialization. It is divided into four chapters. The 
first two outline the main interpretations of this pro-
cess from the 1930s up to the present, while the last 
two address the central issue of the modification of the 
predominant industrialization model. The author 
takes a critical view, not only in terms of a long-term 
historical perspective, but also of the policies im-
plemented during recent years in response to the cri-
sis, which are generally marked by "stabilization with-
out creativity" and the hope of resuming economic 
growth with the help of direct foreign investment. 
In line with ideas developed by ECLAC, the author 
proposes an industrial strategy based on the achieve-
ment of "inward-directed growth" through the crea-
tion of capital and mass consumer goods industries, 
the continuance of selective import substitution, the 
establishment of clear-cut guidelines for the division 
of labour within the region and the application of a 
selective and dynamic policy aimed at gaining market 
positions in the central countries. 
The economic, social and political conditions which 
must be met if such a strategy is to be carried out 
successfully include, inter alia, the elimination of 
structural heterogeneity; political, administrative and 
financial decentralization; a considerable advance in 
technological development; the creation of an auton-
omous industrial and technological core; strengthen-
ing the national entrepreneurial sector; and an in-
crease in State autonomy and efficiency. Towards the 
end of the article, the importance of political aspects 
are underscored; the systematic effort required to 
apply this strategy, the imbalances to which it gives rise 
and the obstacles in its path make it necessary for the 
strategy to be based upon the participation, motivation 
and creativity of society as a whole. 
*Head of Department, German Development Institute, 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
I 
Insufficient inherent 
momentum within the 
industrialization process 
The decline in exports of raw materials con-
sequent upon the world economic crisis was fol-
lowed by a need to substitute domestic produc-
tion for imports. Originally, when import sub-
stitution was still a spontaneous process, it repre-
sented a defensive strategy. Even in its dirigistic 
phase —from the end of the Second World 
War— it never developed into a comprehensive 
and aggressive industrialization strategy. "In-
dustrialization" in Latin America meant the in-
troduction of technical progress not into all sec-
tors of the economy but only into the modern 
branches of industry and the export-oriented 
sectors: mining, agriculture, and trade. 
Unlike East Asia (Japan, South Korea), Latin 
America retained its pre-industrial economic 
and power structures. Consequently, the region 
had to rely on the "modern sector of the econ-
omy" in seeking high rates of growth. The mod-
els of development were dual or unbalanced 
based on the premise that the momentum of the 
modern sector would gradually dislodge the tra-
ditional structures. However, in many countries 
opportunities for import substitution were ex-
hausted as early as the 1960s, and insufficient 
action was taken to mitigate internal imbalances 
and thereby increase domestic demand. Sectoral, 
r eg iona l , and social imbalances —the 
heterogeneity within and among the various sec-
tors— were soon found to form a critical barrier 
to the inherent momentum of the industrializa-
tion process. 
The shape of industrialization was de-
termined from the outset by the attitudes of up-
per and middle-class consumers. The in-
creasingly marked concentration of incomes 
which reflected the economic, social and political 
imbalances resulted in the premature imitation 
of consumption patterns typical of the in-
dustrialized countries, in particular the United 
States. It steered industrial development towards 
consumer durables, including cars, and sectors in 
which development depended on investment by 
transnational companies; for many years only 
scant importance was attached to labour-
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intensive exportable consumer goods and indeed 
to capital goods. This type of industrialization 
did not absorb an adequate fraction of the 
quickly-expanding labour force and resulted in a 
rapid increase in foreign participation, which lat-
er was frequently excluded from deliberations 
on industrialization strategy. 
Industries under foreign control (the motor 
vehicle, chemicals and pharmaceutical indus-
tries, for example) experienced a period of 
vigorous growth as long as the —mostly small— 
domestic markets remained unsaturated. In 
many instances, assembly and packing plants 
were commissioned, but the subsequent trans-
fers of resources {profits, payments for tech-
nologies) represented a constant drain on the 
balance of payments. The national private sector 
has largely continued to produce simple con-
sumer goods, demand for which has expanded 
only sluggishly, especially since the mid-1960s, 
because of the stagnation in agriculture, the 
strong concentration of income, and the absence 
of government corrective policies. 
Growth in the agricultural and industrial sec-
tors was largely ascribable to a few large compa-
nies, while small and medium-sized national firms 
were neglected, their development even being 
hampered by the economic policy pursued. 
However, an industrialization process confined 
to large companies implied that there was no 
alternative to importing foreign technologies. 
This productivity was further aggravated by the 
fact that the technological and industrial options 
selected by the industrialized countries (large-
scale technologies, armaments industry) were 
emulated in an increasing number of sectors. 
Medium-sized and even small countries like-
wise spent many years trying to press ahead as far 
as possible with an import-substituting type of 
industrialization. Despite its inadequate geo-
graphical size, Chile, for example, opted for an 
industrialization path looking to heavy industry 
and forward integration. Even countries such as 
Uruguay sought to establish a motor vehicle in-
dustry, thereby overlooking the advantages of 
industrial specialization. Such industries tied up 
considerable financial resources but did little to 
accelerate the industrialization process because 
expansion in the industries manufacturing in-
termediate products remained inadequate and 
intra-indus trial demand limited; moreover, they 
soon became obsolete owing to the limitations of 
national technological capacity. Only the larger 
countries were capable of substituting domestic 
production for some of the more complex im-
port items, thus developing an industrial appa-
ratus with increasingly clear vertical and horizon-
tal linkages. 
In Brazil, the economic and political in-
fluence of the groups predominating within the 
pre-industrial sector was nullified, and industry 
came under pressure to step up its competitive-
ness. Since the mid-1960s, moreover, Brazil's 
domestic market had proved to be sufficiently 
large to afford industrialization a further boost: 
by means of government investment in the basic 
and capital goods industries and also investment 
by foreign groups in the development of fully 
integrated motor vehicle complexes and indus-
tries producing consumer durables and showing 
considerable intra-industrial demand. Since the 
mid-1970s , Brazil has also become an in-
ternat ional ly significant expor te r of man-
ufactures. It owes its exceptional position in 
Latin America, however, to its size and potential, 
and also to massive commitments by multi-
national groups; social, sectoral and regional im-
balances here are certainly no less pronounced 
than in the other countries. 
Although imports continued to expand 
(both despite and on account of the import-
substituting industrialization strategy), and the 
evolution of the terms of trade was perceived to 
be critical in Latin America, virtually all countries 
in the region have relied on exporting their 
large-scale and well-diversified natural resources 
to back up their industrialization process. Export 
business is transacted by foreign and, to an in-
creasing extent, domestic mining and petroleum 
companies, and also via certain segments of agri-
culture, which has undergone thorough mod-
ernization only in the large countries. Because of 
the significance of agriculture in export business, 
and by extension, the power held by landowners, 
the efforts made to remove the structural obsta-
cles to industrialization in the agricultural sector 
have remained scant, and more and more com-
promises have had to be made in economic poli-
cy. In some small and medium-sized countries in 
particular, it was not long before signs of stagna-
tion emerged because the excessive^ emphasis 
placed on import substitution precluded any in-
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dustrialization based on natural resources, and 
more specifically on agriculture, a strategy which 
would have entailed an export-oriented ap-
proach. 
Some of the proceeds from exports accrued 
to a stratum of society whose position had never 
been challenged in the past but which combined 
imported consumption patterns with limited 
production know-how. Substantial sums were 
also invested in the public sector of the economy, 
where the bureaucracy was quick to adopt the 
values and demand pattern of the weak private-
sector bourgeoisie. Even as early as the mid-
1950s, dependence on a few exports had resulted 
in a shortage of foreign exchange reserves, 
though this conduced to a general feeling of ex-
port pessimism rather than to any change in 
favour of exporting manufactures. Latin Ame-
rica was slow in emulating the shift of emphasis 
in world trade toward manufactures during 
the period of rapid expansion on the world 
market which lasted from 1955 until 1980. 
Whereas in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan 
massive redistribution measures, including agrar-
ian reforms, were instrumental in securing high 
rates of saving, in Latin America a degree of 
concentration of wealth and income by far high-
er than in virtually any other region of the world 
led to consumerism in relatively narrow popula-
tion strata, to squandering of resources and —in 
periods of crisis or more attractive interest levels 
abroad— to a massive flight of capital. Whereas 
in the industrialized countries the financial in-
frastructure was established parallel to and on 
the basis of the industrialization process, in Latin 
America no mobilization of domestic capital 
based on the expansion of the financial in-
frastructure occurred because of the excessively 
easy access to cheap foreign capital. The capital 
inflow from abroad even partially took the place 
of savings formation at home. 
The exogenous causes of the shortage of re-
sources, and indirectly also of capital formation 
within the region, should not be underestimated; 
undoubtedly, however, these would not neces-
sarily have represented an insurmountable 
obstacle to a dynamic industrialization process if 
suitable conditions had been created and enter-
prise-oriented strategies pursued. It is significant 
that the "light exports" of agricultural products 
and petroleum of Argentina and Venezuela were 
precisely those which made it possible to retain 
an extensive growth model over a period of de-
cades, whereas the competitiveness of the econ-
omy, and of industrial exports in particular, 
remained extremely low in relation to the level of 
industr ia l izat ion. Capital is indeed an im-
portant factor in development, but it is by no 
means sufficient in itself. Precisely because the 
export of raw materials and an influx of capital 
from abroad paved the way for a succession of 
"soft options", the deployment of capital re-
mained relatively inefficient. Institutional and 
microeconomic factors, and in particular the low 
level of performance of government and in-
dustrial firms, together with the lack of co-
operation between these, did much more to ham-
per the industrialization process than any short-
age of capital. 
II 
The 1970s: The road to crisis 
The problematic elements of the Latin American 
industrialization model outlined above were 
compounded in the 1970s by factors which at the 
outset could be ascribed largely to the region's 
power structures and economic strategies but 
subsequently to changes in the world economy: 
—The oil price rises triggered off substitu-
tion programmes, most of which entailed large-
scale projects having a long gestation period and 
requiring extensive imports and foreign financ-
ing. It was soon found that dams ( such as that of 
Itaipú) were too large and ecologically question-
able; that nuclear programmes were financially 
demanding and technologically unpredictable; 
and that a scheme like Brazil's alcohol pro-
gramme were not only costly but also antisocial 
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because of its displacement of small farmers. In 
some cases, significant substitution effects could 
be achieved, but the programmes concerned al-
ways exacerbated the existing economic and so-
cial imbalances, prevented the implementation 
of alternative schemes —some of which might 
have made for a drastic reduction in energy con-
sumption— and increased foreign debts. 
— T h e upswing in imports and external 
financing was also ascribable to the greater 
emphasis attached to expanding the basic and 
capital goods industries in the large and some of 
the medium-sized countries. The oil-exporting 
countries (Mexico, Venezuela) set out to develop 
their petrochemicals and steel industries, but the 
projects concerned made only slow progress be-
cause the financial and, in some instances, tech-
nological strain exceeded the resources of the 
companies concerned, most of which were State-
owned. Had these projects been executed as orig-
inally planned, they would also have necessi-
tated extensive exports, though the world mar-
ket situation had not been adequately considered 
at the design stage. Admittedly, a number of 
countries succeeded in greatly expanding their 
capital goods industries: between 1978 and 1981 
self-sufficiency in capital goods rose to 80% in 
Brazil, 70% in Mexico and Argentina and 40 to 
45% in Colombia and Peru, but only to 10% in 
Chile. Large sums were also invested in the ex-
pansion of mining companies, many of which 
had been nationalized in the 1960s and 1970s 
with a view to increasing exports. 
—After the seizure of power by the armed 
forces, Brazil and Argentina in particular began 
to develop large-scale military-industrial com-
plexes for security reasons and also in pursuit of 
their objective of becoming major powers (arma-
ments and nuclear programmes, aircraft con-
struct ion, including aluminium industries). 
While Brazil made every effort to become in-
ternationally competitive and rapidly increased 
its exports of military equipment, Argentina's 
m i l i t a ry - indus t r i a l complex r ema ined in-
efficient. Nonetheless, the country succeeded in 
evading the monetarist experiment, in obtaining 
major subsidies for its basic industry, which was 
similarly controlled by the military, in ensuring 
that the domestic private sector was given pref-
erence over foreign direct investment, and even 
in keeping alive obsolete industrial companies. 
Not only did its efforts contribute little to increas-
ing exports; they also tied up an enormous 
amount of capital and entailed extensive import-
ing of armaments. "Military strength" resulted in 
a general neglect of other objectives, in particular 
the upgrading of efficiency by means of in-
dustrial specialization. 
—In the countries of the Southern Cone 
(Argentina, Chile, Uruguay), where opportuni-
ties for import substitution were almost ex-
hausted as early as in the mid-1950s because of 
the length of time which this strategy had already 
been pursued (a tendency which had political 
implications inasmuch as the population was 
relatively well organized), the military gov-
ernments opted for monetarist economic poli-
cies. Placing their trust in market forces, they pro-
ceeded to generally liberalize imports and capital 
markets; however, no adequate support was 
forthcoming for the adjustments to the needs of 
the world market which companies made by 
specializing within the agricultural and industrial 
sectors, and during the second phase in particu-
lar (1978 and 1981), the pressure to adjust be-
came unrealistic in the wake of the "monetary 
approach to the balance of payments" advocated 
by the modern monetarist school. These econom-
ic policies resulted in the loss o í a social consensus 
on basic aspects of development, further ex-
acerbation of existing economic and social im-
balances, drastic contraction of domestic mar-
kets, de-industrialization tendencies, and a 
tremendous increase in speculative capital move-
ments, flight of capital and external indebted-
ness. 
Latin America's foreign debts have mainly 
endogenous causes which were bound to result in 
a crisis in the wake of the changes taking place in 
the world economy. At a time of international 
adjustment, the countries of the region persisted 
in pinning their hopes on a high rate of growth. 
The cumulative effects of overeoncentration on 
the modern sector, an inadequate technological 
basis for the industrialization process and poor 
e x p o r t p e r f o r m a n c e were adversely com-
pounded in the 1970s by various factors: this ap-
plies as much to the above-mentioned gigantoma-
nia in connection with substitution projects in 
basic industries and the energy sector —which 
were not infrequent ly suppor ted by inter-
MODIFICATION OF T H E INDUSTRIALIZATION MODEL/ Klaus Esser 105 
national financing institutions— as to the sub-
ordination of the industrialization process to no-
tions of security policy and military interests. It 
also holds good when one considers the attempts 
made, in particular in Mexico, to pursue a two-
fold policy of implementing major heavy in-
dustry projects and at the same time expanding 
the likewise import-intensive consumer durables 
industry, including integrated motor vehicle 
complexes. In Brazil too, where a large measure 
of import substitution was achieved in this man-
ner, the procedure in question resulted in a high 
level of external indebtedness. It is virtually im-
possible to trace the underlying economic con-
Even assuming that its liquidity problems will be 
alleviated and its debts partially cleared 
—courses of action which are hardly avoidable, 
though there are no signs of their being accom-
plished in the foreseeable future— the region 
faces a fairly protracted period of limitation of 
its external financing facilities. It will not be able 
to recover from its decline before the early 1990s. 
Technocratic attempts at stabilization are at pre-
sent having the effect of making domestic mar-
kets contract, while in the light of foreign trade 
problems it is becoming increasingly necessary 
for economic policies to focus on expanding ex-
ports. The action possibilities open to gov-
ernments for halting the "downward spiral", pre-
venting the further obsolescence of the produc-
tion apparatus, and combating mass poverty are 
proving to be inadequate while this "stabilization 
without creativity" persists. As has been apparent 
in some countries of the region for many years, 
concentration on short-term policies creates an 
inexorable and growing need for stabilization. 
Many governments are still hoping that the 
traditional "growth-cum-debt" pattern can be re-
sumed and repeated. They base their action on 
the familiar concepts of concentrating ex-
cessively on economic growth, improving the cli-
mate for foreign direct investment, and over-
siderations that explain how, despite the auster-
ity programme introduced in the OECD coun-
tries, the traditional obstacles to demand for con-
sumer goods could be removed, thus enabling 
large quantities of goods to be imported. The 
irresponsible allocation of loans by the in-
ternational banking system is undoubtedly as un-
satisfactory an explanation for Latin America's 
adopting such a course of action as any reference 
to increased exports. The combined impact of all 
these factors meant that the economies of the 
region were much more severely affected than 
those of the industrial countries or the countries 
of Asia; it resulted in "derailment". 
coming assumed shortages of capital by raising 
yet more funds abroad. But since stabilization is 
not accompanied by standard-setting economic 
and social reforms, these concepts are en-
countering growing political resistance. The 
coincidence of various factors {internal and ex-
ternal imbalances, foreign indebtedness, satura-
tion of the industrialized countries' markets and 
the protectionism to which these countries are 
resorting in order to facilitate the technological 
modernization of their industries, the third tech-
nological revolution, etc.), has brought Latin 
America to a turning-point. The long period of 
low growth should therefore be used to bring 
about a creative transformation. 
If the region is to overcome the recession, 
regain its industrial momentum, and adjust to 
the changes in world economic conditions, a 
more complex strategy will be required. The 
objective here cannot be to "catch up" with the 
industrialized countries; instead, the region must 
try to avoid their mistakes —which are having 
increasingly serious repercussions, particularly 
with respect to the environment— and to link 
elements of "catching up" and "closing the gap" 
with original solutions which, wherever possible, 
anticipate new developments in certain sectors 
and may even enable the region to "overtake" the 
III 
Stabilization with creative transformation 
106 CEPAL REVIEW No. %WAugust ¡985 
industrialized countries in some areas. What is 
needed is a skillful and flexible combination of 
elements such as the following, the relative im-
portance of which may well vary through time: 
—development of domestic markets to per-
mit "inward-directed growth" via the mass-
produced consumer and capital goods indus-
tries. This will require above all prompt action 
to minimize growth-inhibiting imbalances and 
reinforce the technological foundations on 
which industrialization is based; 
—continuance of import substitution, 
though now with a view to reducing imports 
selectively and preventing a further rise in 
domestic costs, widespread inefficiency, in-
adequate profitability, and limitation of op-
portunities for private-sector investment, phe-
nomena which import substitution has provoked 
in the past; 
—establishment of clear-cut objectives for 
the division of industrial labour within the re-
gion, especially in high-technology research and 
the motor vehicle and capital goods industries; 
—an aggressive but selective policy of forg-
ing links with the industrialized countries, not 
with a view to highly subsidized export trade in 
manufactures, wherever this might be possible, 
but concentrating instead on industrial linkages 
which would enable the region to acquire 
strategically important market positions and 
shares. 
A strategy which seeks to combine elements 
of both inward-looking and outward-directed in-
dustrialization such as this presupposes reforms 
in the following five fields in particular: 
1. Industrialization is a macrosocial problem 
and calls for increasing homogeneity of struc-
tures. The manoeuverability of societies in Latin 
America would be markedly enhanced if non-
industrial production methods in the "tradition-
al" sector were phased out and social, sectoral, 
regional and ecological imbalances were re-
duced. Agricultural reforms in particular are 
long overdue in many countries of the region 
and are an imperative necessity if economic and 
social growth is to become more balanced, the 
rapidly growing urban population is to be fed, 
industrialization speeded up, and politically sta-
ble development achieved. What is required is a 
skillful combination of elementsof structural and 
technological reform, a feature which agricultur-
al reforms have customarily lacked in the past. 
This would entail: 
— selective measures to change tenancy and 
ownership structures and introduce ecologi-
cally acceptable forms of reallocating and 
consolidating farmland, where possible with-
out disrupting modern export-oriented 
holdings; 
— a radical change in the agro-technological 
base in the traditional sectors of agriculture 
and the grouping of small farmers in co-
operatives with a view to largely excluding 
the middleman from trade in mass-
produced consumer goods (this being es-
sential if prices are to be raised and the urban 
population is to be catered for at reasonable 
cost); 
— selective strengthening of the input and out-
put sectors of agriculture (metal-working, 
chemicals; biogas and other decentralized 
energies; agricultural banks); in some in-
stances, in particular where artificial fertiliz-
ers and insecticides are concerned, agree-
ments with industrially advanced neighbour-
ing countries would be an advantage. 
It is important to ensure that the adverse 
financial and ecological effects of the agricultural 
policies pursued in the industrialized countries 
are precluded in this region. Evaluation of the 
industrialized countries' experience and know-
ledge of new methods applicable in bioecologi-
cally-oriented agriculture are therefore essential. 
The aim here must be to develop an agricultural 
sector in which the consumption of costly energy, 
artificial fertilizers and pesticides, and thus the 
level of government subsidization, is kept as low 
as possible. It is not to give priority to the de-
velopment of the agricultural sector but to speed 
up the pace of industrialization which, in the 
small and medium-sized countries in particular, 
will not be possible until modern technology and 
modern production methods are introduced in 
the agricultural sector. 
2. Although industrialization requires con-
centration of the population and the emergence 
of centres of economic agglomeration, the pro-
cesses of urbanization and economic concentra-
tion, proceeding almost unchecked as they did in 
the region in the absence of government 
counteraction, soon generated marginalization 
tendencies and had a deleterious effect on the 
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economy as a whole. Political, administrative, 
and financial decentralization would counteract 
the urban agglomeration process and the neglect 
of the hinterland and of "absolute poverty", and 
change the features of the industrialization pro-
cess. Stimulating regions and communities to act 
on their own responsibility and initiative and 
encouraging self-help organizations are in-
strumental in invigorating and expanding the 
non-durable consumer and capital goods in-
dustries, thereby broadening the basis for in-
dus t r i a l i za t ion a n d r e n d e r i n g i t more in-
dependent. 
The objective of tapping neglected regional 
and local potential via decentralized develop-
ment is not to initiate a process of "self-centred 
regionalization" or "regionally centred develop-
m e n t " bu t r a t h e r to counte rba lance con-
centrations of population and agglomeration (as 
has recently been done in Spain), if possible with-
out obstructing the development of national in-
dustrial cores or diminishing their international 
competitiveness. Advantage must be taken of the 
many attempts made and initiatives launched to 
develop regional circuits. Although special 
schemes such as that designed to assist the North-
East of Brazil are justifiable, emphasis should 
initially be placed on the elimination of intra-
regional economic and social imbalances rather 
than on financial compensation to offset the dis-
crepancies between rich and poor regions such as 
is customary in the industrialized countries. 
Priority should be attached in this context to 
strengthening financial authority at the regional 
and local levels and to developing small towns 
("agro-urban centres") in the hinterland. 
In this decentralization endeavour, much 
depends on ensuring that the municipal level is 
geared to the concept of self-help. Experience in 
Latin America has shown that even countries 
which have made some progress in industrializa-
tion cannot imitate the industrialized countries in 
the provision of a national social security system 
and must in any case avoid the cost explosion 
which has occurred in the OECD welfare states. 
Furthermore, the burden on central government 
must be eased wherever possible so that it can 
concentrate on the major tasks of guiding and 
controlling the industrialization process. The 
State should stimulate, guide and monitor, but 
provide only subsidiary support for local self-
reliance. Developing countries will therefore dif-
fer from industrialized countries in the distinc-
tion which they must make between individual 
responsibility and social security, especially in 
view of the extreme importance of moulding 
together into small, uncomplicated, closely-knit 
communities a population which has become in-
dividualized in the wake of migratory processes 
and is held together, if at all, by an unstable 
family structure, and in which distrust is the pre-
dominating social sentiment. The public interest 
can only become a generally meaningful value if 
society is organized from the bottom up: in small 
groups, especially self-help groups to combat 
poverty, and community structures at the local 
level. 
3. Dynamic industrialization is inconceivable 
wi thout mastery of technology. T h e tech-
nological development of industry, for its part, in 
turn presupposes an appropriate mentality: no 
industrial revolution can take place without a 
revolution in value systems. In Latin America, 
however, industrialization began in a society in 
which, despite numerous adjustments, tradition-
al values still predominate. The countries of the 
region selected the capital investment option, but 
accepted the rent-seeking attitude of the in-
vestors. At the same time, they neglected the 
most important factor of development, namely, 
the creation of satisfactory resources in terms of 
human capital. 
Perhaps the most important cause of the de-
pendence incurred by the incorporation of tech-
nology was the shortage of technical skills. The 
education and training system reflects the im-
balances prevailing in the economic field: the 
lower strata of society have the doubtful privilege 
of undergoing an extended period of education 
during which they learn little or nothing about 
self-help and technology. Except in Brazil, the 
size of the skilled workforce has remained lim-
ited, and the scant provision made for training 
is normally concentrated in special institutions 
(SENA, etc.). The universities produce large 
numbers of intellectuals who understand little of 
industrialization and, because of the social in-
equities and obstacles to their own careers, set 
their sights on political change. The domestic 
and foreign private sector prefers to recruit its 
highly qualified employees from foreign or 
national private colleges. 
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Priority needs to be given to an education 
and training offensive to generate basic and ver-
satile skills and promote a generalized mastery of 
technology, including the new technologies. 
Only such an offensive would make it possible to 
reinforce self-help capacity among broad pop-
ulation groups, to ensure understanding of var-
ious technological levels and the combination of 
these, to develop selected key technologies, to 
establish a dynamic innovation system with a 
high level of technological flexibility, and, Finally, 
to create a "national technological culture". 
At this stage, rapid adaptation and imitation 
of technologies is more important than basic re-
search. "Technological independence" cannot be 
achieved within the foreseeable future, but this 
t ime-span can certainly b r ing a continual 
reinforcement of "technological autonomy", 
which ought to be directed towards ensuring a 
rapid increase in productivity, in particular by 
means of the new key technologies. The path 
towards the commercialization of adapted or im-
itated technologies can be shortened, especially if 
it is possible for industry and research institutes 
to work in close co-operation. However, intensive 
and continuous co-operation between the uni-
versities and industry will not be possible until 
profound reforms have been implemented in the 
long-since dysfunctional university sector. A mea-
sure of the stature of the new democracies in the 
region will be whether or not they can be success-
ful in implementing reforms such as these, which 
do not represent a primarily financial problem. 
4. The international learning process is tend-
ing towards the view that dynamic industrializa-
tion is possible only if an autonomous industrial 
and technological core can be created and con-
stantly strengthened. "Industrialization" implies 
the creation of a national industrial core, in par-
ticular in the capital goods industry, which pos-
sesses the technological competence to mod-
ernize the entire production sector to an increas-
ing extent out of its own resources. This core can 
only develop from a sustained and co-ordinated 
commitment on the part of government, in-
dustry, and research institutions. A country 
which relies exclusively on the free forces of the 
market is in effect consolidating its state of 
backwardness and will be largely negatively 
affected by the new technologies. It may even be 
said that an import-substituting industrialization 
which does not seek to establish a technologically 
.competent industrial core and to promote tech-
nical progress in all sectors can at best aspire to 
earn such large amounts of foreign exchange 
revenue from its exports of raw materials that it is 
able to advance in step with the technological 
state of the art in the industrial countries by vir-
tue of constant imports of capital goods. 
It is astonishing that technological com-
petence within the State and national companies 
in the countries of Latin America has remained 
so low. Little effort was made over a period of 
decades to back up industrial development by 
establishing independen t technological ex-
pert ise. Technological and entrepreneuria l 
capacity for adaptation and imitation remained 
limited, and, economic linkages were slow to 
multiply. Industrialization failed to develop suf-
ficient momentum of its own because import sub-
stitution was based on foreign technologies and, 
in many dynamic sectors of industry, on foreign 
direct investment. It was not until the 1970s that 
the institutional conditions for importing and 
developing technology were improved in the larg-
er countries. But even now, only Brazil has the 
ability to ensure the rapid incorporation of tech-
nology and, in a few sectors only, to achieve auton-
omous technological development. 
The only developing countries which can un-
dergo a process of dynamic industrialization are 
those which succeed in incorporating traditional 
and new technologies strictly in accordance with 
their needs and on a low-cost basis. A "forward-
looking strategy" at technological level is re-
quired before it is possible to incorporate sever-
al generations of technology simultaneously, to 
make "development leaps", to develop con-
structive relations with foreign companies, to 
proceed beyond complementary foreign trade in 
at least some selected fields, and to enter the 
international technology race. For all developing 
countries, however, a minimum level of tech-
nological competence is essential if advantage is 
to be taken of the opportunities offered by both 
old and new technologies and national control 
over the development process is to be gradually 
extended. 
5. How many technologically competent 
firms, how many national firms that are in-
ternationally competitive are operating on the 
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economies of large countries such as Mexico or 
Argentina? This question is even more legitimate 
when viewed in the context of comparison with 
the countries of East and South-East Asia, where 
the industrialization process in many cases is of 
much more recent date. The propelling force of 
industrialization in market economies, i.e., the 
private companies, which take most of the de-
cisions on production and investment, remains 
undeveloped. Even in Brazil the industrial 
bourgeoisie drops into third place behind gov-
ernment and foreign capital in many key sectors. 
Given this situation, it not uncommonly happens 
that too little attention is paid to the functions 
which the private sector should perform in in-
dustrialization, in developing technology, and in 
exporting manufactures. This is particularly true 
with respect to the following; 
— the development of a small group of large, 
efficient, national companies with di-
The implementation of such a concept is de-
pendent on whether or not the new democracies 
can succeed in strengthening the autonomy of 
the State and at the same time can upgrade its 
capacities for concertation, monitoring, and con-
trol. Because political will is not clearly agglomer-
ated and administrative capacities are in-
adequate, in many instances governments have 
so far not even been successful in indicating a 
clear course for the public sector to adopt. 
Countries such as Argentina are largely "un-
dermanaged"; they show evidence of accumu-
lated institutional deficits which could only be 
remedied over a space of years because of vested 
interests and considerations ofparty politics. De-
cisions on industry policy or regional policy, for 
example, are often taken without reference to 
the criteria of economic profitability. Inspection 
and evaluation exercises cannot suffice to direct 
attention to more efficient and less costly options. 
Of particular importance is the lack of modern 
systems of "bonuses and sanctions" both in the 
versified production, innovative capacity, 
and financial management jsystems, which 
are instrumental in ensuring active integra-
tion into the world market and may come to 
resemble multinational groups; 
— the emergence of technologically up-to-date 
small and medium-sized enterprises such as 
those which play an important role in the 
OECD countries as subcontractors —render-
ing the larger companies more com-
petitive— and also in the innovation pro-
cess; 
— the restructuring of labour-intensive small 
and medium-sized firms in traditional sec-
tors of industry which have an entrepreneur-
ial and employment potential that has so far 
remained largely untapped and which have 
been slow in fulfilling their functions in the 
fields of production, distribution, and provi-
sion of services. 
public sector and in relations between govern-
ment and enterprise, such a system being re-
quired for any transition to the phase of "in-
tensive industrialization". 
However important stable macroeconomic 
conditions may be, macroeconomic control alone 
is not sufficient —as is evident in the industrial 
countries too— to manage the technological up-
heaval and its profound social implications. In-
deed, macroeconomic steering must be com-
plemented by enterprise-oriented policies which 
single out areas of emphasis in a number of 
selected fields. The establishment of clear focal 
areas and the creation of sufficient negotiating 
authority to have these consolidated are much 
more important than the still popular formula-
tion of comprehensive macroeconomic and sec-
toral plans, for example. The various spheres of 
policy (industrial policy, regional policy, etc.) 
should be directed towards consolidating these 
focal areas, reconciling apparently contradictory 
elements therein, correcting the imbalances 
IV 
Objectives and instruments 
of a complex industrialization strategy 
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which continually emerge in the wake of 
economic growth, and smoothing the path for 
industrialization. 
Industrial policy should be directed towards 
strengthening the national industrial core and 
upgrading international competitiveness. It 
should be concentrated on a few areas having 
favourable prospects for development, and be 
selectively designed so as to support a small 
group of modern entrepreneurs. In the field of 
the new spearhead technologies, attention must 
be directed towards the high-volume, standard-
ized product path in a small group of strongly 
export-oriented foreign companies, and also to-
wards the rapid diffusion to virtually all fields of 
the economy, using medium-sized national en-
terprises as vehicles, of the innovations in the 
computer industry (this having the currently 
most important key technology) as well as in the 
information and communication industry. The 
development of such medium-sized national 
firms could be supported by means of fixed-
period protection and promotion programmes. 
An over-complicated network of policies and in-
struments such as tends to impose too much 
strain on both the public administration and the 
entrepreneurial sector could be avoided by 
establishing an efficient development bank 
which would support industrial and techno-
logical change with inter-company linkage 
contracts, participations and consultancy pro-
grammes. 
The capital goods industry should be given 
top priority. Its expansion should focus not on 
large-scale projects requiring considerable capi-
tal and imports but wherever possible on the in-
telligent deployment of modern technologies. 
This is likely to be feasible wherever gov-
ernments and companies can agree on "tech-
nological grading", for example. Whereas the 
neoliberal experiments have frequently led to an 
upturn in import business, both government 
purchasing and private-sector demand should in 
the future look more towards domestic sources 
of capital goods. The State should place obstacles 
in the way of channelling investment towards 
projects in which economic profitability is of only 
secondary importance. Despite positive effects 
on the overall economy, tax incentives for invest-
ment in construction should be eliminated in the 
interest of supporting readiness to commit ven-
ture capital. In addition, structural change 
should be promoted directly, for example 
through cheap loans to companies which have 
excelled by virtue of innovation effort or export 
expansion. 
Further concentration on the basic industry 
sector would in any case be extremely difficult to 
finance, would provide the region with excess 
capacity, and would represent an erroneous path 
of specialization for many small medium-sized 
countries, even within a context of regionaliza-
tion. The process of consolidation should ad-
vance hand-in-hand with a gradual elimination of 
subsidies, especially in industries which are 
stagnating or in decline in the industrial coun-
tries. The consumer goods industry should con-
centrate in future on mass-produced consumer 
goods rather than on complex durables. Here, 
the objective should not be to widen the range of 
products but to increase demand by standardiz-
ing products, limiting production to a few mod-
els and types only, and introducing other mea-
sures to bring down costs, many of which would 
also reduce energy consumption and would be 
more acceptable from the environmental view-
point (e.g., a move away from the principle of 
producing disposable articles). In weak indus-
tries, restructuring programmes such as those 
introduced in Southern Europe should be 
launched. Restrictions on the development of 
the basic industry sector and consumer durables 
should be paralleled by restrictions imposed for 
several years on the extension of material infra-
structure; despite grave problems of indebted-
ness, in some countries there has been but little 
evidence of this. 
In technology policy the primary need at this 
stage is to optimize technologies imported from 
the industrial countries: for example, to place 
greater emphasis than hitherto on acquiring 
technologies on the basis of licenses and other 
forms of co-operation not involving capital 
participation, and then adapting the technolo-
gies thus acquired to specifically national needs. 
The technologies selected should be amenable to 
broad-based diffusion in the agricultural sector, 
the agroindustries, and industries producing 
mass consumer goods and capital goods. Here, 
the scope for action open to governments and 
companies could best be maximized by means of 
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a series of relatively small but technology-
intensive investments. Modern production and 
information technologies, precisely because of 
their flexibility, make it possible to manufacture 
in small series on a viable basis. Assuming a pre-
dominance of clear-cut, smaller projects carried 
out mainly by domestic firms and financed with 
domestic funds, demand for imported capital 
and goods would decline and exports of in-
dustrial goods expand. In addition, this would be 
instrumental in reducing the problems encoun-
tered in the employment and environmental 
fields. 
It appears important to emphasize that it 
would not suffice to establish a small tech-
nologically modern export sector. The aim 
should be to bring about a general improvement 
in the efficiency of the economy, in the level of 
technology it relies on, and in the quality of work-
manship and service, so that more and more 
sectors may become increasingly competitive. 
Specialization, selectivity, and flexibility are pos-
sible, especially if they can draw on a generally 
modern industrial apparatus. An aggressive ex-
port orientation calls for efficiency in a con-
stantly expanding domestic market. The govern-
ment can support the establishment of a broad 
technological base by providing favourable con-
ditions for investment by introducing reforms in 
the education and training system, by making 
effective use of the media, by introducing new 
technologies in the public administration and by 
taking suitable measures in government pro-
curement policy, investment financing, and ex-
ternal economic relations. 
Of decisive importance is the implementa-
tion of strategies to build up a core of medium-
sized enterprises which are equipped with mod-
ern technologies and prepared to operate on 
competitive markets. In many countries there is 
no shortage of firms which, given a suitable 
bonus and sanction system, could develop into 
agents of change. Even a small group of "new 
companies" can exert pressure to adapt on larger 
companies, many of which show weaknesses from 
the viewpoints of research and development and 
export business; such a group can also be in-
strumental in modernizing small and medium 
supply firms, and can furthermore introduce 
modern concepts of labour relations. Only a new 
entrepreneurial core such as this can pave the 
way for the transition to "intensive industrializa-
tion". It is the only agent capable of supporting 
that type of industrialization which the new tech-
nologies render economical in its inputs of 
energy, materials, and capital investment. As 
soon as this core offers sound prospects, it will 
contribute towards mobilizing residual capital 
and bringing back capital expedited elsewhere. 
The employment problem can be alleviated 
only in the event that various factors can be made 
to coincide: a high rate of economic growth 
accompanied by dynamic inward expansion; bet-
ter-balanced distribution, to be brought about 
primarily via structural reforms in the agricultur-
al sector and the creation of intermediary orga-
nizations; the juxtaposition of various tech-
nological levels, in particular a combination of 
high-level and low-level technologies in the in-
dustrial sector, such as is found in China; and in 
addition a redistribution of the volume of labour 
and expansion of the education and training pro-
cess. Furthermore, short-term special pro-
grammes to reduce unemployment are in-
dispensable (small dams, rural road construc-
tion, housing, social services, reafforestation pro-
grammes). Infrastructure and production-
oriented measures of this type, which would not 
infrequently obviate the need for major projects 
heavily dependent on external financing, ought 
to absorb more than 20% of the labour force in 
many countries, thereby substantially alleviating 
the employment problem. The programmes 
should be transformed into local programmes as 
soon as possible. Finally, it is essential that pop-
ulation growth be drastically curtailed. Most 
Latin American experts agree that the problem 
of absolute poverty or pauperization is financial-
ly and organizationally soluble, even during a 
period of recession such as this, provided the 
countries concerned make sufficient effort to 
solve it; the problem, it is claimed, remains un-
solved for want of political attention. 
Apart from the social costs involved, the 
price paid for industrialization in ecological terms 
is extremely high, even in the earlier stages of the 
process. But neither the public nor govern-
ments are as yet sufficiently aware of the need to 
protect the environment. Despite the cata-
strophic conditions prevailing in some areas 
of agglomeration, very little is spent on environ-
mental protection. Road traffic is largely 
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responsible for air pollution. Rail networks could 
be developed with little external assistance, in-
corporating road-and-rail links for example, or 
in combination with a network providing bicycle 
tracks, of which there are very few at present. In 
addition to consideration of such energy-
conserving, less environmentally offensive, and 
lower-cost transport systems, importance should 
also be attached to regionalizing the automotive 
industry, thereby permitting its thorough mod-
ernization, and likewise to introducing speed re-
strictions such as those imposed in almost all in-
dustrialized countries. The aim in the industrial 
sector in this respect should be not only to extend 
the inspection and monitoring systems (ex-post 
environmental protection) but also to examine 
industries before they develop with a view to en-
suring their environmental compatibility. At 
least those of the industrialized countries' en-
vironmental and nature conservation policies 
which are not excessively expensive could be 
emulated in the short term. If ecological disasters 
are to be avoided, a number of projects will have 
to be abandoned. 
The low level of progress towards integra-
tion made in past decades can be ascribed pri-
marily to the fact that although relatively weak 
countries have endeavoured to form regional 
associations, the larger countries have set virtual-
ly no store by regional markets, regarding 
national industrialization as their priority. It was 
not until the mid-1970s that it became evident 
that they would likewise have to rely on an intra-
regional industrial division of labour in order to 
achieve economies of scale, and that regional co-
operation was indispensable in view of the pace 
of technological innovation. As can be seen from 
the example of the European Community, the 
fragmentation of an industrial area cannot 
be remedied simply by establishing a customs 
union. What is needed is a joint strategy in the 
fields of science, technology, and industry. Re-
search and development programmes have been 
but few in number to date in Latin America, 
this omission being particularly grave in the 
field of the new key technologies. 
More realistic than an integration model 
which is overambitious in terms of political and 
planning possibilities is a form of regionalization 
which takes account ofthe growing discrepancies 
in levels of industrialization. The determining 
factor here is the interest felt by the larger 
countries in having stable regional markets for 
their manufactures, providing, of course, that 
their supply capacity is sufficiently advanced to 
permit production at world market price levels. 
Close co-operation among the industrial 
agglomeration centres within the region will 
have spill-over and spread effects that will ben-
efit the other countries, which are unable to 
develop so differentiated an industrial structure 
and have to seek niches for their exports by 
resorting to industrial specialization. The pro-
cess of negotiation between the advanced and the 
less advanced countries will determine whether 
traditional forms of the division of labour can be 
dispensed with òr can be gradually displaced. 
Latin America has to overcome its "export 
pessimism" in a situation wherein the multi-
lateral trade order set forth in GATT is exposed 
to progressive erosion, protectionism among the 
industrial countries is becoming yet more pro-
nounced, and the new information and organiza-
tion technologies are rendering the trade position 
ofthe region even more difficult. In the case of 
labour-intensive industrial goods in particular, 
the developing countries' export opportunities 
are diminishing in consequence of technological 
innovation. This consideration lends substance 
to the call for "technological development leaps". 
Active relations with the industrial countries will 
become indispensable, their nature being de-
pendent on the level of industrialization 
achieved and also on amenability to the continu-
ing furtherance of the industrialization process. 
The region should enter upon an emulation race 
which is backed by active but selective policies in 
the fields of trade, foreign investment, tech-
nological and scientific co-operation and de-
velopment financing. In many cases, "counter-
trade" will be inevitable during the initial period; 
the decisive factor, however, is arrival, step by 
step, at a high level of efficiency, creativity, and 
competitiveness on the basis of technological 
modernization throughout a large part of the 
production apparatus. 
Such a complex strategy can be implemented 
effectively only if the fronts shaping domestic 
politics, which were stiffened during the 1970s, 
become more relaxed and it proves possible to 
bring together social and political forces in the 
interests of a "social project". The resolve to co-
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operate is much more in evidence today in many 
c o u n t r i e s , a n d , p r o v i d i n g a d e q u a t e gov-
ernmental co-ordination is forthcoming, could 
really afford scope for broad-based "social 
pacts". This is all the more probable in the light of 
the fact that those strata which tended to reject 
the concept of industrialization have forfeited 
political power by siding with backward-looking 
military officers, by engaging in experiments 
with monetarism, and also as a result of de-
teriorating terms of trade and the technological 
developments taking place in the industrial 
countries (high-fructose corn syrup, single-cell 
proteins, etc.). 
A broad-based consensus is also required be-
cause the leitbiid of a technology-based growth 
model —its image as a guide— is indeed prob-
lematic. Technological dependence is virtually 
inevitable during the course of a somewhat pro-
tracted learning process. The new technologies 
have p r o p e r t i e s which do not only imply 
economies in input factors, low maintenance 
costs, and versatility; it should be recalled in par-
ticular that they will do little to contribute to-
wards overcoming the employment problem. 
T h e social consequences of innovation leaps, as 
indeed in the industrial countries too, are not of a 
solely positive nature, and supporting measures 
are also required to counteract the new im-
balances . If the complex industrial ization 
strategies are to solve such problems, they pre-
suppose participation; participation is the es-
sential element ensuring that sufficient motiva-
tion, creativity, and human effort is forthcoming 
to guarantee that such strategies can be suc-
cessfully carried out. 
